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RICHARDSON V •. ROYAL INDEMNITY CO.

Feb. 1943]

[21 C.2d

reetly sustained the demurrer as to the first cause of action,
which attempted to charge Chandler as administrator.
[2a] Likewise there was no error in the ruling sustaining the ohjection to the' introduction of evidence on the second' cause of action. When the action was dismissed with
prejudice as against Chandler's administrator,the Royal
Indemnity Company, as surety on the bond of Chandler as
guardian, was the only defendant in the action. The" facts
alleged show that there was no adjudication in either an
equity case or in the probate court, that any .obligation
existed on the part of Chandler or his estate .to the estate
of Baxter which had not been discharged. It is elementary
that before a surety can be held for a breach of the bond
filed by the guardian, there must beanaj>propriate judicial
decree establishing the fact of the breach and the amount
due.. (Oook v. Ogas, 143 Cal. 221 [77 P. 65] and cases cited;
Keck v. Keck, 16 CaLApp.2d 521, 526 [61 P.2d79].) ,We
are not here considering any special dl1fenses raised or whicih
could be interposed by the defendant. Insofar as we are
concerned with the facts shown by the second amended com~
plaint there is no allegation, and because of the absence of
any appropriate adjudication It cannot nOw be alleged, that
there is anything due from Chandler as guardian which has
not been settled and paid.
[3] The cases relied on by the plaintiff state the. rule invoked by him, namely, that equity will afford relief against
a guardian who within that rule has fraudulently prevented
a full disclOsure of all the assets of the estate, and a decree
of the probate court settling such a fraudulent account will
not be a bar to equitable relief. (SeeCaldweZl~. 'fOtylor,
218 Oal. 471 [23 P.2d 758, 88 A.L.R. 1194], and cases cited
p. 475.) But those cases cannot assist the plaintiff.. The
equitable relief which he seeks is available to him only against
the. party who committed the preach, or his personal representative. [2b] In any action where relief was sought
aga~nst the surety, the fact of the breach and the amount
due had been adjudicated either by the probate court or by
decree in a separate action against the defaulting fiduciary.
(See for example Maloney v~ Massachusetts Bonding & Ins.
00.,20 CaL2d 1 [123 P.2d 449].)
The trial court correctly concluded that the second amend~
ed complaint failed to state a cause of action against .the
,suretr. [4] No abuse of discretion is shown in the court's
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refusal of permission to file the third amended complaint.
Application to file it was made after the plaintiff's voluntary
dismissal with prejudice as against Chandler's administratrix and after the trial and the entry of judgment. There
is r:o showing that the plaintiff was entitled to· further opportunity to plead in the present action.
The judgment and the order are affirmed.
Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Traynor, J., and Peters, J., pro
tem., c·oncurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing
"
1943.

[L. A. No. 17928. In Bank.

w~ denied March 8,
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Estate of ELLA WALLACEPERKINS,Deceased.LILLIAN MIDDLEBROOK, as Administratrix, 'etc., Appellant, v. CLIFFORD L. PERKINS, Respbndent.
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[1] Decedents' Estates-Distribution-Appeal-Notlce'of .Appeal.
-While an administrator may not appeal from a decree of distribution, in the interests of justice the statement in the notice
of appeal that the appeal is taken by appellant as administrator'
.
may be considered as mere matter of description.
[2] Id.-Heirship Proceedings-What Oonstitutes.-A probate proceeding is not one to determine heirship where the issue pre~
sented in objections to a petition. for distribution is as to the
legal character of the property owned by the decedent at the
time of death.
[3] Id.-Distribution-New TriaI.-Since effective resistance to a
petition for distribution pursuant to Prob. Code, § 1020, requires
written objections, and since any party may demand a jury
McK. Dig. References: [1] Decedents' Estates, § 1071; [2] Decedents' Estates, § 981; [3] Decedents' Estates, § 1065; [4] New
Trial, § 230; [5] Conflict of Laws, § 20; [6] Descent, § 5; [1] De-scent, § 33; [8] Descent, § 28; [9, 10] Descent, § 31.
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trial of issues of fact formed thereby, after verdict andjudgment a motion for a new trial will lie. (See Prob. Code, § 1231.)
[4] New Trial-Order-Specification of Grounds.-Code Civ. ProG.,
§ 657, requiring an order granting a new trial on the ground of
, insufficiency of evidence so to specify, is inapplicable where
the court does not allow a new trial but pursuant to Code
Civ. Proc.,§ 6,62, either changes the findings or modifies the
judgment without' reopening t,he case or taking' additional evidence. Hence no specification is required where the order
made recites the granting of the motion so far as certain
findings and conclusions are concerned and then modifies them
and the judgment, and otherwise denies the motion.
[5] Conflict of LawS:-Succession.-An estate consisting of personalty is subject to the laws of succession of the state in
which the decedent is domiciled at the time of his death.
[6] Descent-Legislative Control.-The laws of succession are
within the control of the, Legislature which can designate the
heirs and the proportions to be received.
'
[7] Id.-Rights of Heirs.-Until the death of the ancestor the
right ,of inheritance is a ,mere expectancy.
' ,
[8] Id.-Death of Widow Without Issue-Community Propert)-

Place of Ac~uisition.-Prob. Code, §§ 228, 229, 'apply to all
property subJect to probate proceedings in California regardless of its prior status in a foreign jurisdiction. Under these
sections personal estate of a decedent domiciled in California
which was acquired outside the state during marital relations
and in which a predeceased spouse had some interest ma;
b.e. reclassified under the law of the domicile for succ~ssion
~urposes, whether or not the foreign ownership is substantIally the same as the property would have if acquired in
California. (Overruling Estate of Allshouse 13 C.2d 691
91 P.2d 887.)
"
[9] Id.-Death of Widow Without Issue-Separate Property.-

On the death of a widow intestate and without issue leavin oo
personal estate which represents marital earnings and was ac:
quired by her by way of gift, descent or bequest from her predeceased husband while resident in another state, a son of
the husband by a former marriage inherits the property reclassified as the husband's separate property or that of the
. [8] Chang~ of domicile as affecting character of property prevlOusly acqull'ed as separate or community property note 92
A.L.R,. :1347. See, also, 3 Cal.Jur. Ten-year SuPp. 503 11 Am
Jur.185.
'
.
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community, to the exclusion of d.ecedent's sister.~ ,(See Prob.
Code, §§ 228, 229.)
..
[10] Id.-Death of Widow Without Issue-Separate Property~
, Gift.....:..Securities bought bya husband in his' wife's name,
and proceeds of his life insurance policies naming her as beneficiary, including a group policy a part of the premiums of·
which are paid by the employer; are a gift to' her within
Prob. Code, § 229.
,

APPEAL from part of a judgment of the Superi~r Court
'of Los Angeles County decreeing distribution of an estate~
Thomas C. Gould, Judge. Affirmed.
George Appell and Harry A. Mock for Appellant.
C. H. Hartke ahd Freeman R. Brant for Respondent.
EDMONDS, J.-The probate co'iirt overruled the respondent's objections to a petition for distribution of the estate
of Ella Wallace Perkins and entered judgment that he is,not
entitled to any part -of her estate. Thereafter, on the re~
spondent's motion for a new trial, it entered anotherjudgment which ordered distribution of' aU of the decedent's
,estate, except $4,313, to him. This judgment followed' th~
terms of "modified findings of fact" and," modified conclusions of law." The case is here upon a notice of appeal
,by "Lillian Middlebrook, administratrix of the estate of"
Mrs. Perkins, reciting that she appeals from the modified
judgment, except that portion of it which ordersdistribution of the $4,313 to herself and her two sisters, and "from
that certain motion for new trial granted in said estate."
,From this notice it appears that the appeal is directed to a
minute order made by the probate court following the hear,ing of the respondent's motion.
.
The question for decision concerns the character of the
-property left by +"irs. Perkins. The respondent claims all
of her estate as separate property of her deeeaseq. husband
'which she acquired by gift from him. By its second judgment the probate court sustained the respondent's contention
", as to all of her property except a portion valued at $4,313,
which had come to her by bequest.
Ella Wallace Perkins died intestate in this state leaving
three sisters, Lillian Middlebrook, Rose Dunlap Franklin,
and Jessie W. Chapman, as her sole survivors. Forty-two

.'
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years before, she had married Wallace T. Perkins and, prior
to his death in 1931, they resided in the State of New York.
There were no children of the marriage. Clifford L. Perkins,.
the respondent, is the son of Wallace T. Perkins by a prior
marriage.
Mr. Perkins had remarried in 1897. He was then in the
banking business in Denver. In 1904, he and his wife removed to New York, where he became an executive officer
of one of the large banks there. The record includes no
evidence of any property he had either when he married
Ella W. Perkins or when they became residents of New York.
But the testimony shows that after he went there as a successful banker he bought life insurance and also stock in a
number of corporations. The certificates representing this
stock were either issued in his name or· in the name of his
wife. As his secretary expressed it: "When Mr. Perkins
acquired his own holdi~gs,· he would either purchase some
. in smaller 'amounts for Ella, or he would ask for a transfer
'or division or the amount that he bought, some in his name
and. a smaller amount in hers."
. Itappears that during this time the salary of Mr. Perkins
was $40,000 per year and that his income from dividends
and investments amounted to as much more. His salary
'checks and the checks representing his income from other
sources were deposited in a bank account from which he paid
both his living expenses and for the securities which he
. bought from time to time. He procured insurance of $90,000
upon his life. The policies representing this insurance named
his wife as the beneficiary· of .$30,000, his son as the beneficiary of the same amount and a friend as the beneficiary
of the remainder. Of this insurance, $10,000 was obtained
under a group policy issued to t:!J.e bank of which Mr. Perkins was an officer. One-half of the premiums on the group
policy were paid by the bank j all of the other premiums
were paid by Mr. Perkins from his income.
Shortly after the death of her husband, Mrs. Perkins came
to California bringing with her' about $19,000 in cash. and
some stock and bonds. There is evidence to the effect that
while a resident of Los Angeles she made a number of in. vestments. She had inherited $765.01 in 1918, and in 1933
she received a legacy of $3,548.15.
.
Following the death of Mrs. Perkins, Lillian Middlebrook
was named as administratrix of her estate. In due time
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the administratrix filed her first and final account, together
with a petition for distribution of the estate to h~rs~lf and
her two sisters. The respondent filed written obJectIons to
the petition for distribution, claiming the entire estate under
section 229 of the Probate Code as the separate p~operty
of Mrs. Perkins' predeceased spouse. Upon a hearmg t~e
probate court ruled against the respondent and decreed dIStribution to the three sisters of the decedent. No appeal was
taken from this decree and the administratrix distributed
the estate in accordance with its terms and procured her
discharge.
.,
Within the statutory time therefor, the respondent moved
the court to grant a new trial. Upon the submission of this
motion, the court filed "modified findings of fact andcon~
elusions of law" reciting that the entire estate of Ella ,W.
Perkins . except the sum of $4,313, was her separate property
acquired by gift from Wallace T. Perkins...As a .conclusion'
of law the court found that the respondent JS entItled toall,
of the' estate except that amount. A "modified ju~gme~f'
in accordance with this decision was thereupon entered.
The appellant- presents several points as grounds'fo; reversal of the order granting a new trial and, of the Judgment. First she contends, since the nature of .the· proceed~
ings before the probate court. was to determine t~~'h;~rshi'p:
of the respondent, the order should have' been .,lImIted- to
that issue.. A second point is that an' appeal IS the only
remedy for one dissatisfied with a decree of distrib"?t~?Ilj ~d
that a motion for a new trial after such a decree IS unau-.
thorized and improper. Her third contention is 'that~ as~
suming the motion for a.new trial w,as proper, the. faIlure
of the court to comply WIth the reqUIrement of' sectIon. 65~
or the Code of Civil Procedure that the order g:t:antmg'a:,
new trial upon the ground of insufficiency of' the i evidenc'e
must so specify in· writing, is ground for reversal of thE! .'
Judgment. Finally, the appellant urges that. the money re.:.
ceived by Ella W. Perkins as the p.roceeds of ~s~rance upo~
the life of her husband was not a gift to her Wlthm the meal1~
ing of section 229 of the Probate Code. In this connection
she asserts that the removal of Mrs. Perkins to California
did not change the legal character of the money which, was
paid to her in New York.
..
.
'..
.
The respondent takes the pOSItIon that an admmistratrIX,
is not ,8 party' aggrieved by the judgment, hence the present

...
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appeal should be dismissed. Upon the merits, he argues that
the court acted entirely within its powers in granting the
motion for a new trial and modifying its findings and judgment to accord with the evidence and the law governing the
rights of the parties.
[1] Considering first the respondent's contention that the
appeal should be dismissed, the record shows that it was
taken by "Lillian Middlebrook, administratrix of the estate
of" Mrs. Perkins. Although it is a fundamental principle
that an administratrix may not appeal from a decree of distribution, this court, looking to the interests of the parties
to litigation as of primary importance, has very liberally
construed such a notice as one in which the designation of
fidministratrix may be considered as descriptio personae,
(Estate of Strong, 10 Cal.2d 389 [74 P.2d 231].) Notwithstanding the fact that in other papers presented by the appellant in connection with the present appeal it is stated;
that she is appealing "as said administratrix," the rule of
the Strong case will be applied in the interests of justice.
[2] Turning to the points urged by the appellant, the
statement that the purpose of the proceeding in the probate
court was to determine the heirship of the respondent is
incorrect. In his objections to the petition for distribution,
he alleged the facts regarding his parentage and "that the
entire estate of ... Ella Wallace Perkins was the separate
property of . . . Wallace T. Perkins ... and came to . . .
[her] by gift, descent or bequest from . . . [him]." Answering these objections the administratrix admitted the reo
lationship of the respondent, but she specifically denied that
the property owned by Mrs. Perkins at the time of her death
was the separate property of Mr. Perkins, or that it came
to his wife by gift, descent or bequest. The issues, therefore,
presented for determination by these allegations concern
only the legal character of the property owned by Mrs.
Perkins at the time of her death.
[3] The point raised concerning the motion for a new,
trial requires a construction of section 1231 of the Probat~
Code, which reads: "A motion for a new trial in probate
proceedings can be made only in cases of contests of wills
either before or after probate, in pro~eedings to determin~
heirship and interests in estates, and in those cases where
the issues of fact, of which a new trial is sought; wereo!
such character as ,to entitle the parties to have them tried
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by a jury, whether or not they were so' tried." Section
1020. of the same code provides that any. person' interested
in the estate may resist an application for distribution. .In
construing the predecessor sections of sections 123Land .1020
(Code Civ. Proc., §§1714, 1665, 1668) this court held that
the test to be. applied in determi:o.ing .whether the motion
will lie in a particular probate proceeding is whether the law
. expressly authorizes an issue of. fact to be framed in. suc~
a proceeding. It has been held that a party to a probate
proceeding is entitled to a trial by jury when there is statu~
tory authority for the formation of issues of fact upon th~
question to be determined. (Carter v. Waste, 159' CaL 23.
[112 P.727]; Estate of Baird, 173 Cal. 617 [160 P,10781;
O'Brien v. Nelson, 164 Cal. 573 [129 P. 985]; Estate of
Sutro,152 Cal. 249 [92 P. 486, 1027] ; and Estate of Wick,
ersham, 138 Cal. 355 [70 P. 1076,71 P. 437].) In deciding
these cases, the court found the necessary statutory author~
ity in the language of section 1668 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, reading: "At the time fixed for the hearing •..
any person interested in the estate may appear and contest
the petition by filing written objections thereto." That sectionhas since been repealed, but the Probate Code, now ilji
effect, makes provision for an application to' distribute the
estate of a decedent, which is to be heard upon notice. "Any
person interested in the estate or. any coexecutor or coad~
. ministrator may resist the application. " (§ 1020, Prob.
Code.) Although this language is. not as definite. as that
which was used in section 1668 of the Code of Civil Procedure, effective resistance to an application for final . distribution requires written objections, and, at least where issues
of fact are formed in that way, as they were in the presellt
case, any party may demand a jury trial and, after verdict
and judgment, make a motion for a new trial.
.
.
[4] The appellant's contention that the trial court committed reversible error by not making a written order speci~'
fYlng the insufficiency of the evidence as a gro~nd for. its
decision upon the motion for a new trial has no' factual basis
to support it. This statutory requirement becomes important only jf the motion is granted. When,. upon such a
motion, the court follows the procedure authorized by sec7
tion 662 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and either changes
the findings or modifies the judgment without reopening the
case for further proceedings and the taking of additional

..

,;' ,
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evidence, no new trial is allowed. (Spier v. Lang, 4 Ca1.2d
711, 714 [53 P.2d 138]; Wyman v. Monolith Portland Cement 00., 3 Cal.App.2d 540 [39 P.2d 510]; De Arman v.
Connelly, 134 Cal.App. 173 [25 P.2d 24] ; Moore v. Levy,
128 Cal.App. 687, 694 [18 P.2d 362].)
But, it may be argued, the form of the minute order made
by the court following the hearing of the respondent's motion for a new trial compels a contrary conclusion. This
order recites that it is granted insofar as· certain findings
of fact and conclusions of law are concerned; that these
findings and conclusions of law and the judgment are
modified and changed to provide that the entire distributable estate, less the sum of $4,313.16, be distributed to the
respondent, and that otherwise the motion for new trial is
denied. Nevertheless, the action of the court was to deny
the motion. A similar situation was presented in Bureau
of Welfare v. Drapeau, 21 Cal.App.2d 138 [68 P.2d
998], where it was held that an order in substantially the
same terms as the one now before' the court was, in effect, a
ruling denying the motion and granting alternative relief.
The same construction has been placed upon other orders
in this form. (Roraback v. Roraback, 38 Cal.App.2d 592
[101 P.2d 772] ; Garcia v. Bechtol, 134 Cal.App. 615 [25 P.
2d 987].)
The merits of the controversy between the parties turn
upon the question as to whether sections 228 and 229 of the
Probate Code apply to p-roperty acquired in a common-law
property state by one who was domiciled in that state. At
the time of Mrs. Perkins' death, these sections read as follows: "If the decedent leaveS neither spouse nor issue, and
the estate, or any portion thereof was community property
of the decedent and a previously deceased spouse ... such
property goes in equal shares to the children of the deceased
. spouse. and their descendants by right of representation ... , "
(§ 228.) "If the decedent leaves neither spouse nor issue,
and the estate or any portion thereof was separate property
of a previously deceased spouse, and came to the decedent
from such spouse by' gift, descent, devise or' bequest •.. such
property goeS in equal shares to the children of the deceased
spouse and to their descendants by right of representation;
" (§ 229.)
.
[5] Mrs. Perkins concededly was domiciled in California
the date of her death. Her estate, consisting entirely of

at
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personalty, consequently was subject to the)a",:s of s?cces.;
sion Gf this state. [6] Since th~ right of inherItance IS not
an inherent
natural right but one which exists .01;lly by',
statutory authority, the law of succeSsion is eIitirely-within.
the control of the liegislature. (Estate of PhilUps,:?03<Cal~
106 [263 P. 1017]; In re Watts' Estate, 179 ,Oat 20 {175'
P. 415] ; McCaughey v. Lyall, 152 Cal. 615 193-P, 68!1;.E8~.
tate of Bump, 152 Cal. 274 [92 P. 6431; Estate:ofPorte'l';
129 Cal. 86 [61 P. 659, 79 Am.St.Rep. 781; 'Estq,te o/,Stanford, 126 Cal. 112 [54 P. 259, 58 P. 462; 45 L.R.A~7~81,i:
Estate of Donnelly, 125 Cal. 417 [58 P. 61l; Sharpv~ L(YUpe,
,120 Cal. 89 [52 P. 134,586]; lnre Wilmerding'sEsta~e~117'
Cal 281 [49P. 181]; Ohilds v. Gross, 41 Cal.App.2d680
[107 P.2d424]; Estate of Stewart, 30 Cal.App.2d594 J8G
P.2d 1071].) The designation of heirs and theproportlOns
which they shall receive are subject to the .legislative will
(Estate of Stanford~ supraj In re Wilmerding's Estate;
supra) ,and [7] until the death of the ancestor, the right
of inh.eritance is not a vested one but a mere expectancy.
(Estate of Loyd, 170 Cal. 85 [148 P. 522] ; Estate of alar",
94 Ca-1.App. 453 [271 P. 542] ; Estate of Warner, 6 Cal.App.
361 [92 P. 191].)
..
Sections 228 and 229 together provide for the succession
of all property in which the predeceased spouse' had some_
interest. Their scope is not limited to community properly,
and they have been construed as providing that upon. the
death of the survivor of the marriage, intestate and without
issue, the property should go to the. famil;r or ,families of the
spouse or spouses through whose effortS the estate wasaccu":
mulated. (Estate of Rattray, 13 Cal.2d 702, 713 [91 P;2d
1042] ; Estat~ of Putnam~ 219 Cal. 608, 611 .[28 P,2d',271i
Estate of McArthur, 210 CaL 439;445, [292 P.469, '7,2 4.L.R.
1318] ; Estate of Mercer, 205 Cal. 506, 511 [271
1Q671;
Estate of Hill, 179 Cal. 683, 688 [178 P~ 710];' 'E~tateof
Brady, 171 Cal. 1, 4 [151 P~ 275].)B;Y·th~se se,~ti~l1stt~e
court has said, the Legislature intended tha~ .~ ll~eal.de~
sceridant
the predeceased spouse sho~d succE,le<i to,~U:
property of the surviving spouse; in :WJ:i.ich ,the.pred'ecea~,~d.'
spouse owned an interest; 1£ therewer~ nO'liriealdesce~daiit~
of either spouse, the property should then 'be diVided'equ~n.y .
between the respective families of the two spouses 'by whi>se efforts it was accumulated. If, however,' th~'property,pa<l:
originally' come to the predeceased spouse ·by . other DieahS

or
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than his efforts during. the existence of the marriage, such
as acquisition before marriage, or by gift, devise, or bequest
subsequent to the marriage,then the Legislature intended
that such property should descend, upon the death of the
survivor, entirely to the family of the predeceased spoilse.
(See cases cited supra.)
[8] The only way in which that legislative purpose may
be given effect is by applying sections 228 and 229 to all
property subject to probate proceedings. in California, regardlessof its prior status in a foreign jurisdiction. Implicit in this construction, of course, is the reiilassification,
for the purposes of succession only, of property acquired in
the foreign jurilldiction in accordance with the community
property law of California.: Although this court in Estate
.of Thornton, 1 Qal.2d·l, [33 P.2d 1, 92 A.L.R. 1343],. held·
that section 164 of the Civil Code was unconstitutional iilso:f'a~as~t purported, to r:e~lassify the property of a spouse
who acquired, it in a common-law state and later brought it
.toQa.lifornia; the decision was expressly limited to a reclassificl1-tion duriI).g the . lifetime of the spouse. Such a <!hange
in the m,cid,ents and rights of· the husband and wife in the.
propertY acquired by either or. them,said the court, would
constitute 'a disturbance of, a vested right, and prior decisions concerning the effect of. the statute prevented a deterniinatibn that it was ~'part of our succession laws and hence
valid as 11" statute of succession."
Under sections 228 and 229. of the Probate Code, the
issue or kindred . of the predeceased spouse are statutory,
heirs of the surviving spouse, and their rights under those
sections do not veSt until the death of the latter.' (Estate
of Watts, 179 Cal. 20, 23 [175 p. 415]; Estate of Bixler,
194 Cal. 585, 595 [229 P. 704].) The property acquired
outside of this state during the marital relation is subjected
to the laws of succession of California by the fact that, at
the time of the death of the surviving spouse, ,he or she was
domiciled within its borders; it may therefore be reclassified
under the law of the domicile. In Estate of Allshouse, 13
Oal.2d 691 [91P.2d 887], this court held that, under section
229 of the Probate Code, the origin of an estate may be
traced into a foreign jurisdiction and the California classification of property applied to the property there acquired.
But the decision was qualified by the requirement that the
nature of the foreign ownership must be substantially the
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same as that which the property would have if. a~qilired iri
this state. Upon a reconsideration of the reasoning of that
case it seems obvious that the limitation of section 22,9 to,
pro~erty, which, in the forei~ juri.sdi,cti6n,hadsub~tantially
identical incidents to the claSSIficatIOns of property m a community property state has no' reasonable foundation :and is
not consistent with the legislative intent expressed m sections 228 and 229 of the Probate Code. As those statutes
affect succession only, their purpose is fully carr~ed~ollt i~
the probate court distributes the property upOn tlieQasis of
its classification had it been acquired in Oali~ornia. ,. Apply~'
ing that rule, it is unnecessary to ~eterfu.ine w¥~tlie~~e
property owned by Wallace T. Perkms,at,t1;letItne,:of h,IS
death would have been community or ,his separate property
if it had been acquired in California. [9] The ~esponde~t,
as his son, is entitled to all of the estate of M~.Perklns
which came to her by gift, descent, devise or bequest trom
the property of her predeceased husband recl~ssified as either
his separate property or that of the commumty., .. '
'. '.
[10] A further question concerns the man.ner 'f. w~lch
Mrs. Perkins acquired the PFoperty which is to .be.dlstnbuted by the probate court. The record showB,without contradiction that she had no gainful occupation .ahd'no inde-,
pendent Income. Her husband maderepeated,gifts· of se~
curities to her. Proceeds Qf his life insurance policies were
also a gift to her within the me'aning of sections 228 and 229
of the Probate Code. (See Estate of Rattray~ supra; disap~
proving Estate of MiUer, 23 Cal.App.2d 16 [71 P;2d 1117],
and Estate of Lissner, 27 Ca1.App.2d 570 [81P,.2d 448].)
The fact that one of these was a group policy. anq. that oneh;Uf of the premiums were paid hy his employer does not
place that, policy in any different category fr?m the others.
Such a payment of premiums by the employer was merely
another and additional form of compensation for the services
of the husband.
This evidence fully supports the trial court's findings
that the entire estate of Mrs. Perkins, ex~ept the sum of
.' $4313.16 came to her by gift fro:rn her previously deceased
hu'sband.' In view of the fact that the property owned by
Mrs. Perkins at the time of her death. was appraised a~ approximately $14,000, probably leSs than' one-third of the
amount she received by gift froin her husband, and the court
allowed her kindred the full amount of the two legacies
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which came to her from other persons, the division was favorto them.
The judgment is affirmed.

able

Shenk, J., Oarter, J., and Schauer, J., concurred.
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent. The question at issue is' not
the wisdom of Probate Oode sections 228 and 229 or the
power of the Legislature to control the succession to property
but the applicability of these sections to property acquired
by a husband and wife in a common-law state and brought
to this state by the surviving spouse who dies intestate here.
Their applicability depends neither upon their wisdom nor
the range of legislative power but upon whether the Legislature has exercised its power in this particular legislation.
Yet the majority opinion gives no heed to the language of
Probate Oode sections 228 or 229, the provisions of the Civil
Code defining community property and separate property, or
the decisions of this court interpreting those definitions. Its
reasoning is that there is a legislative purpose to give the
property to the family of the spouse through· whose efforts
it was accumulated, and that this purpose can be fulfilled
only by' applying sections 228 and 229 to all property subject
to probate proceedings in California irrespective of its previous character in a foreign jurisdiction. This reasoning admittedly involves a reclassification, for the purposes of succession, of property acquired by a husband and wife while
domiciled in a foreign jurisdiction. The majority opinion
points to no statutory provisions calling for such a reclassification but attempts to fill the gap by the declaration that
such a reclassification is implicit in its own construction of
the scope of the legislative purpose. It has thus construed
the legislative purpose to extend beyond the legislative language and then read into the language an implication that
alone would make possible the execution of the enlarged
purpose.
Were the legislative purpose as extensive as the majority
opinion construes it to be, its accomplishment would hardly
be left to the chance of an implication indirectly arrived at.
The Legislature's silence is particularly sighificant in view
of its past activity in bringing within the community property laws property acquired by husbands and wives while
domiciled beyond the state's borders. (See Estate of Frees,
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187 Cal. 150 [201 P. 1i2] ; Estate 0/ Drishaus, 199 Cat 369
[249 P. 515] ; ~state of Thornton, 1 Ca1.2d 1 [3.3 P.2d.l, 92
A.L.R. 1343].)' Sections 228 and 229 expressly refer. to
community property and separate property, terms peculiar
to community property laws, and make no provision for trans-.
lating into these terms property acquired under other laws.
If the property acquired by Mrs. Perkins asgifts"from her'
husband and as beneficiary of his life insurance policies was
not community property when she acquired it, or was not
transformed into community property when she brought it
to California its succession is not controlled by section 228
of the Prob~te Code. If it was' not separate property of
the hUlSband when Mrs. Perkins acquired it from him, sectioli
229 of the Probate Code cannot govern its succession. In
other words if her absolute ownership under the .laws . of
New York ~as not modified when she became domiciled. in .
this state, her sisters are entitled to succeed to her estate
under section 225 of the Probate Code.
.
At the tim:e of Mrs. Perkins' death section ·228 read as
follows: "If .the decedent leaves neither spouse nor issue,
and the estate, or ,any portion thereof was community prop~.
erty of decedent and a previously deceased spouse . . . such
property goes in equal shares to the children of the decea~ed
spouse .. . and if none, then one-half of such communIty
property goes to the parents of the decedent .... and the other
half goes to the parents of t h e d ecease d spouse..... "
· Sect'IOn
229 read as follows: "If the decedent leaves neither spouse
nor issue, and the estate or any portion thereof was separate
property of a previously deceased spouse, and came to the
decedent from such spouse by gift, descent, devise or bequest,
such property goes to the children of. the deceased spouse
. . . and if none then to the parents of the deceased
spouse. . . . ."
.
These sections embody laws of succession and relate. to
classifications that existed during the lives· of the spouses;
(See W. W. Ferrier, Jr., Rules of Descent Under Probate
fiJode, §§ 228 and 229, 25 Cal.L.Rev. 261.) They do not de:
fine community property or separate property for purposes
of succession'; they do not even come into operation until·
the character of the property has. been determined under
the appropriate statutes governing the classification of property as community or separate. They goV'ern the succession
'only of what "was community property" and .what "was
,
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separate property" during the lives of its o'Ylleni. The
meaning of those terms, and therefore the scope of the sections, can be found only in the definitions in sections 162,
163 and 164 of the Civil Code. If the property is not encompassed by these sections it cannot be regarded as having
been community property or the separate property of a predeceased spouse, and sections 228 and 229 can have no ap~
plication.
Sections 162 and 163 of the Civil Code provide that all
property owned by either spouse before marriage or acquired
afterwards by gift, bequest, devise or descent, together with
the rents, issues, and profits thereof is his or her separate
property. Section 164 provides that all other property acquired after marriage by eIther spouse or both is community
property.
These, sections could not transform the property in question into community property while it was being acquired
by the husband in New York. Nor was the property con~
verted into community property when Mrs. Perkins became
domiciled in this state. The provision in section 164 that
personal property acquired while the spouses were domiciled
elsewhere is community property when it would not be the
separate property of either if acquired while domiciled in
this state :Was held unconstitutional in Estate of Thornton,
1 Cal.2d, 1 [33 P.2d 1, 92 A.L.R. 1343]. This case also held
that section 164 could not be considered a statute -of succession and that its definition of community property did not
apply, even for purposes of succession, to property that persons acquired while domiciled in another state. In that case
Mr. and Mrs. Thornton came to California with personal
property that they acquired while domiciled in Montana.
Upon Mr. Thornton's death his wife claimed one-half the
property under Probate Code, section 201 providing that
"upon the death of either husband or wife one-half of the
community property belongs to the surviving spouse." In
holding that Civil Code section 164 could not transf<;>rm
the property into community property the court denied Mrs.
Thornton's claim to one-half the property under Probate
Code, section,201. Justice Langdon dissented on the ground
that Probate Code section 201 used the term community
pr,Qperty as defined in Civil Code section 164, and as broadened -by that definition was constitutional. In the present
case Mr. Perkins never came to California with Mrs. Perkins
!

i
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so that there is even greater reason than in Estate of Thornton for holding that the property brought into this state
was not community property. Since Civil Code section 164
does not extend, for purposes of succession under Probate
Code section 201, to property acquired in another state, it
cannot be so extended for purposes of succession under Probate Code section 228 without an outright repudiation of
Estate of Thornton.
Whatever the merits of the majority and dissenting opinions on the highly controversial issues in ,Estate of Thornton,
the Legislature took account of the decision and qualified
its' effect by adding section 201.5 to, the Probate Code providing: "Upon the death of either husband or wife onehalf of all personal property, wherever situated, heretofore
or hereafter acquired after marriage by either husband or
wife, or both, while domiciled elsewhere, which'would not
have been the separate property of eithe~ if acquired whi1~
domiciled in this state, shall 'belong to the surviving, spouse;
the other one-half is subject to the testamentary dispqsition
of decedent, and in absence thereof goes. to the:surviving
spouse. . . . " This section is based on the theory 'that suc~
cession to property acquired by a husband and wife before.
they were domiciled in this 'state should be subject, to' the
rule governing the succession to property acquired by spouses
domicHed here. It applies only in the case ot it surviving
spouse and does not extend to such cases as the present one
involving heirs other than a surviving spouse. The Legisla~
ture was apparently not then ready to devise a proVision
comparable to section 201.5 that would apply to such situa.
tions.
Although the estate in question had its source in Mr. Perkins's marital earnings it was never community property.
Since it was not community property when acquired and was
not converted into community property when Mrs. Perkins
became domiciled here, Probate Code section 228 cannot govern its succession.
Likewise section 229 does not govern its succession. -That
section does not bring the property within its purview, for
the term "separate property" is but a differentiation from
the term" community property'; in section 228. It is well
established that the two sections are interdependent and must
be construed together. (Estate of Rattray, 13 Cal.2d 702
[91 P.2d 1042]; Estate of Simonton, 183 Cal. 53 [190 P~
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442].). Section 229 envisages "separate property" as that
acquired other than by :marital earnings and the fruits there~
of envisaged by section 228. (Estate of Rattray, supra; Estate of HiZl, 179 Cal. 683 [178 P. 710].) When the property in question was acquired by Mr. Perkins in New York
it could no 'more be classified as «« separate property" than
as "community property" under the laws of this state. As
a nonresident who never came to California he was untouched
by its laws. He never owned, and therefore never gave
community property in the sense of section 228, or separate
property in thE! sense of section 229. In defining "separate
property of the. husband" section 163 of the Civil Code, in
contrast to section 164, does not purport to include property
acquired by aD: owner while domiciled in another state. There
is therefore less reason to' hold that it includes such property
in its definition for purposes of succession under Probate
Code section 229 than there would have been to hold in
Estate of. Thornton, supra, that such property could be included in the definItion in Civil Code section 164 for purposes of succession under Probate Code section 201. Even
if Civil Code section 163 could be given an extraterritorial
operation, the property in question as marital earnings would
not meet the requirements of separate property set forth in
that section. To treat such earnings as if they were separate property would do violence to the scheme of succession
embodied in Probate Code sections 228 and 229, which contemplates that in the event both spouses die without lineal
descendants, marital earnings .are to be inherited equally
by the respective families of the two spouses by whose efforts it was accumulated. (Estate of Hill, 179 Cal. 683
[178 P. 710].)
In Estate of Allshouse, 13 Cal.2d 691 [91 P.2d 887], holding that Probate Code section 229 did not apply to the succession of property that had its source in marital earnings
in another state, this court declared: "But the facts of the
present case afford no basis for application of the rule. The
husband stayed in Missouri and there made provision for his
wife and for respondent in contemplation of the operation
of the property laws of that jurisdiction. There was no
change of marital domicile; no change of situs of the property. The assets were still in Missouri at the time of the
husband's death, and they there passed into the ownership
of the widow. The widow's act in later establishing a domi-

'~ile

in this state) subjecting her pr~perty toits l~ws, ~ho,ur~
not have the retroactive effect of a prior act of the husb~:hd
which would have changed the nature of his own ownership.
In short, to reclassify the husband's Missouriholdin.g '\Y(>uld'
. be for this state to reach beyond its borders ang ltD.pdse its
~ubstantially different classification' upon both a fo:diier'owner
and a former ownership which. obtained in a foreign ,jurisdiction. This may not be done.
' .. . '
, 'Respondent, therefore, is not entitled by' virtUe: of .sec~ , .
tion 229,supra, to distribution of the division of: property
here under discussion: And as there is no Californiasta:tute
of succession which provides that the' estate. 'of a . widow'
,which originated in transfers to her of property',held by
her previously deceased husband in common law' .sole ownership shall revert to the husband's. line, ,anaState derived
from.such source and brought into California by the widow,
who here died intestate and without issue; is her separate
property, having' for purposes of application: of the. laws. of
succession the same status as the separate property of one
who has never married. It follows that the portion of decedent's estate which comes within this classification' is distributable under section 225 of the Probate Code. "
Likewise in the present case the only ownership with which
this court is concerned is that of the' widow, who, as a single
person first brought the property within Califo:rnia law ·after
her husband's death. The ownership of the property by the
predeceased spouse and its then 'ciassification terminated 'bE!~
fore the property was brought to California. The 'ownership
and classification of. the personal property .'before, it. was
brought to California by the widow was sole ownership ,of
an unmarried person and had thereafter in California the
same status as the property of one who had never married..
Respondent argues that under the law, of New 'York the
husband's rights in the property at the time of acquisition
were equivalent to the rights of a California·husband with
respect to separate property in California; and that section
229 should govern the succession of the property as it would
separate property in California. The property, however,
would not be the husband's separate' property had he acquired it while domiciled in this state,but on the contrary
would be community property because it represented mari.
tal earnings. It is a strange construction that interprets the
term "separate property" in a California statute to include
210.2d-ll1
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the very kind of property it was designed to exclude. Under
respondent's theory the terms "separate property'! and
t'community property" would apply to property of California husbands and wives as the California statutes contemplate, but in their proposed application to the property of
'non-residents the term "separate property" would be made
to include property that would be regarded as community
property in the case' of residents. Confusion and inconsistency would inevitably attend any attempt to translate the
property rights of ilonresidenthusbands and wives in a
common-law state in terms of the property classifications of
a community property state.
,
The majority opinion having read into Probate Code sections 228 and 229 it legislative intent to reclassify property
acquired outside the state proceeds to overrule Estate of
Allshouse, supra, which would govern this case,on the ground
thitt it is not conSIstent with the attributed intent. It has
gone far afield to avoid the facts that California classifications do Iwtapply. to property, acquired' by husbands and
wives while domiciled outside. the state 'and that provisions
for the reclassification of property acquired in foreign juris~
dictions do not include the rules embodied in sections 228 and
229. It has. gone so far aneldas to formulate a statute of
succession that the Legislature itself did not undertake to
formulate when it had occasion to do so. Whatever the
court's view of the wisdQIJ1, of the rules of succession prescribed by' the Legislature,it is timely to .recall that they
are not immutable, and tha:t. the' task oftheir periodicrevisiOlifalls properly to the Legislature. . (Estate of de Oigaran,
150Ca1. 682, 688 [89 P. 833] ; Estate of Nigro, 172 Cal. 474,
477 [156 P. 1019].)
The judgment should be reversed.
Gibson,

C~

J., and Curtis, J., concurred.

Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied March 11,
1943. Gibson, C. J., Curtis,J., and 'I'raynor, J., voted for a
'rehearing;
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IJILLIAN MIDDLEBROOK, Individually and as Administratrix,. etc., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
LOS ANGELES COUNTY et a1., Respondents.
[1] Certiorari-Determination-Motion to Dismiss.-It is incumbent upon one petitioning for a.writ of review to see that n return is made by the court or officer to whom the writ is directed.
In th:e absence of a return, the writ wili be discharged and the
proceeding dismissed on motion.

PROCEEDING to review an' order of the Superior Court
of' ,Los Angeles Comity requiring an administratrix to repossess property. Writ discharged and proceeding dismiRSed
on motion.
.
George Appell and Harry A. Mock. for Petitioner.
C. H. Hartke and Freeman R. Brant for Respondents.
EDMONDS, J.-In an original proceeding, a writ of certiorari was issued to review an order made by the probate
court in the matter of the Estate .of Ella Wallace Perkins,
deceased, requiring the administratrix to repossess property
.Which had been delivered to her, Rose Dunlap Franklin and
Jessie W. Chapman pursuant toa judgment W'hich was later
modified and has now been affirmed~ (lnre Perkins' Estate, ante, p. 561 [134 P.2d 231].) Upon the day set·
for hearing the matter, ClitIordL. Perkins, the real party
in interest, moved to discharge the writ and diSiniSs' the
proceeding. upon the ground that no retuni· had been ' :filed,
and consequently there is nothing before the 'courtto review.
[1] Although it is the duty of the court or officer .to whom a
writ of certiorari is directed to prepare a return, yet: it is
incumbent upon the petitioner for the. writ to see that the
return is made. To accomplish this, he may, if necessary,
invoke the aid of the court which issued the writ to compe]
compliance. with its requirements. . As the person interested
in having the action of the inferior tribunal' reviewed, it is
[1] See 4 Ca1.Jur. 1098; 10 Am.Jur. 543.
McK. Dig. Reference: [IJ Certiorari, §.8L
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